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SUMMARY 
This paper compares the competitiveness of Hungary and the Czech Republic. Of the 
different approaches to what constitutes competitiveness, it takes the institutional one, 
which is crucial to the behaviour of market actors. Weak legal institutions such as 
non-functioning bankruptcy legislation increase costs and decrease the ability of firms 
to compete. But there are obvious problems with measuring the quality of the envi-
ronment for competitiveness. The three aspects considered are the political, the legal 
(including corruption) and the general economic environment. Global statistics are pro-
vided for each, such as the Index of Economic Freedom, followed by data that address 
specific questions, such as ‘How many days a year do your managers have to spend 
dealing with state officials?’ The survey results are intended to give an overall picture 
in each field. 
The two countries seem to have similarly high levels of political freedom. Both are 
deemed generally free, according to all measures (with minor reservations). The situa-
tion is worse with the legal environment, where both lag substantially behind the West-
ern countries, but the situation in the Czech Republic is worse. The findings on cor-
ruption are similar, where the situation is poor according to most sources, especially 
in the Czech Republic. The last chapter of the analysis is devoted to economic free-
doms – especially regulation of the business environment. Both countries can be consid-
ered partly free. The regulation and bureaucracy-related costs seem higher in the 
Czech Republic. 
The author has some doubts about the data quoted in the paper and these are 
discussed in the final section. They concern particularly the level of corruption, which 
appears to be significantly lower in surveys where firms answer direct questions about 
their behaviour. The second caveat concerns a sudden deterioration in the scores for 
the Czech Republic, connected with the recession after 1997. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The aim of the working paper is to 
compare competitiveness of the Czech 
Republic and Hungary. The whole con-
cept of competitiveness is problematic, 
with no generally accepted definition (see 
Chapter 1). It can be seen from many 
different angles. The approach here is a 
comparison of the political, economic and 
legal environment, i.e. the institutions.1 
There can be doubts about the concept 
of competitiveness, but there are obvious 
differences in the institutional environ-
ment that affects market actors. The 
emphasis will be on the conditions pro-
viding the overall background for eco-
nomic activity, which may be, but is not 
necessarily market-friendly. If it is not, 
there are additional costs for entrepre-
neurs, which affect their global ability to 
compete on international markets. The 
connection between the market environ-
ment of a country and its ‘competitive-
ness’ is only indirect. The environment 
determines the long-range ability of firms 
to compete and develop, but it does not 
have an immediate or straightforward 
impact on, say, the balance on the cur-
rent account or the current rate of eco-
nomic growth. The aim, however, is to 
give a global view of the environment 
and so of the potential for the economies 
and firms. There is a crucial problem 
with measuring the quality of the envi-
ronment (see Chapter 2). The data obvi-
ously provide only a proxy measure and 
need to be taken accordingly. 
                                                 
1 ‘The rules of the game in a society’ (North 
1992). 
The goal of the paper is reflected 
in its structure. Starting with the concept 
of competitiveness and the various ap-
proaches to it, the author puts forward 
and defends an approach to it1 that 
creates the basis for the rest of the pa-
per. Chapter 1 contains some remarks on 
the methodology and starts to analyse 
the environment. I will decide for a few 
characteristics that I try to explore. The 
analysis will lead to conclusions. And I 
try to explain the results in the last 
chapter. 
1) DEFINING COMPETITIVENESS 
The concept of the competitiveness on 
the level of states is questionable. There 
is no broadly acceptable definition. Some 
economists find competitiveness an impor-
tant characteristic of economies and oth-
ers regard it as a meaningless concept. 
Among the first are the authors of 
the prestigious Global Competitiveness 
Report (hereafter GCR; Schwab and 
Sachs 2002) and the World Competitive-
ness Yearbook (hereafter WCY; IIMD 
2001). They try to compile an index 
covering huge amounts of surveying and 
data to give an overall picture of the 
competitiveness of countries. Their ap-
proach is criticized, for example, by Lall 
(2001), but without questioning the idea 
of competitiveness as such. On the other 
hand, other economists deem the whole 
concept of competitiveness among states 
as meaningless (Kinkor 2001), arguing 
that only firms can compete, not states 
or economies. Most authors writing 
about competitiveness concentrate on the 
microeconomic level (e.g. European 
Commission 1999, Mytelka 1999, Fabella 
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1995, etc.) They use statistics such as 
productivity, wages and share of techno-
logical exports. 
This author agrees with the asser-
tion in Bannock, Baxter and Davis 2003 
that the term is difficult to handle. The 
following definition of competitiveness 
appears: ‘A loose term, popularly used 
to reflect the ability of a nation to grow 
successfully, and to maintain its share of 
world trade.’ 
This paper intends to sidestep that 
discussion. The author does not believe 
in competition at state or national-
economy level, especially not in the form 
of an aggregated index. The concept in 
the GCR is very broad and there will 
always be discussion about the selection 
(and formulation) of the questions, the 
weightings and the conclusions. Although 
the author takes the view that only firms 
can compete on the internal or/and in-
ternational markets. But the paper is not 
confined to the microeconomic level, ei-
ther. First, it seems difficult to bring 
anything new into this field. Nor can the 
author agree with the purpose of most 
of these analyses, which seem usually to 
be targeted at ‘improving the competi-
tiveness of the country’. The conclusions 
of such reports then take the explicit or 
implicit form of advocating government 
help, investment or support for certain 
industries. These reports in fact indicate 
the eagerness of governments to pursue 
ad hoc (discretionary) industrial policies. 
It is questionable whether the state (or 
government) can steer industries to a 
higher level of technological exports. The 
attitudes to government abilities in this 
respect vary substantially, from strong 
trust in government (e.g. Lall 2001) to 
belief in its new role (e.g. Gál, Moldicz 
and Novák 2003) or total rejection (e.g. 
Kinkor 2001). The author does not share 
the belief that state functionaries have 
better information and motivation than 
the private sector and are able to direct 
industries (or the whole economy) by 
transferring resources from productive to 
less productive firms. On the other hand, 
most economists would agree on gov-
ernment answerability for the overall 
economic environment: the legal and po-
litical systems and global economic back-
ground. This always has an impact on 
the behaviour of market actors and so 
affects their ability to compete. This envi-
ronment differs substantially between 
countries. To take the example of bank-
ruptcy, it makes a huge difference 
whether the process takes six months or 
five years. Or consider state regulation. 
It is again essential whether a business 
can be started in three days, three 
weeks, three months or three years. The 
environment thus creates direct or indi-
rect costs for firms. In fact, cross-
country empirical studies identify a posi-
tive association between long-term GDP 
growth per capita and measures of insti-
tutional quality at the beginning of the 
period over which the growth rate is 
measured (Fries, Lysenko and Polanec 
2003). 
The institutional change is one of 
the most difficult steps in the transfor-
mation process. Institutions can be 
classed as formal or informal (Jonáš 
1999). The first group consists (for ex-
ample) of the legal environment – the 
whole legislative and judicial system. The 
second is more difficult to outline. It 
consists of habits in society, such as 
moral forms. Formal institutions are rela-
tively easy to change, but the moral 
shifts of informal institutions take place 
over the long term. Government action 
can influence the development of formal 
institutions but informal institutions can 
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only be influenced indirectly. But the 
transformation called for both to change. 
As the legal environment shifts towards 
the market economy, so the mood and 
morals of nations should shift in the 
same direction, for example towards 
self-responsibility and diligence. There are 
disputes about interpreting the impor-
tance of these institutional changes dur-
ing the transformation process. The In-
ternational Monetary Fund, for instance, 
opined that ‘the importance of institu-
tional reforms was recognized already in 
the beginning of the transition. In prac-
tice, however, too little attention was 
paid to it [sic], in contradiction to the 
macro economic development and that 
[inadequate attention applied] from the 
side of international consultants as well 
as from the side of domestic politicians’ 
(IMF 2002). 
The importance of the institutional 
environment is a subject of general de-
bate (in developed as well as transition 
countries). Still more is the importance of 
individual aspects of the environment, 
which the present author considers to 
have a strong impact. Ill-functioning in-
stitutions in the economy impede firms in 
developing and competing in ways that 
appropriate institutions do not. Institu-
tions in fact create a crucial background 
for all activities in the economy. The 
analysis in this paper focuses on the in-
stitutions under governmental control, 
where policy changes can be recom-
mended. A government that creates a 
better institutional environment improves 
conditions equally for all market actors, 
not just preferred groups, and obviously 
enhances the ability of firms to compete. 
The problem of competitiveness will 
therefore be considered in terms of di-
rect and indirect costs imposed on firms 
by the economic environment. Since the 
overall problem is very extensive, just a 
few topics connected with the political, 
legal and economic environment will be 
treated, namely economic freedom, start-
up costs and protraction of court pro-
ceedings. In other words, the treatment 
will not be comprehensive. 
2) METHODOLOGY 
It is hard to describe the overall envi-
ronment and still harder to grade and 
compare it, but there are statistics to 
give a basic picture. It is not advisable, 
of course, to rely on a single source for 
a topic like the institutional environment, 
and even with multiple sources, it re-
mains tricky to arrive at reasonable, de-
fensible results. But if different sets of 
statistics yield similar results, that can be 
seen as a kind of evidence. 
It has been decided in this paper 
to concentrate on a comparison of coun-
tries in the fields of political, economic, 
legal situation or institutional environ-
ment. The weak point already mentioned 
is measuring the quality of the economic 
environment, where data is always ques-
tionable. The problem can generally be 
dealt with on an overall level – there 
are organizations that evaluate countries 
in a specific field (political environment 
or economic freedom) and aggregated 
this into a global picture (e.g. an index 
of political or economic freedoms). These 
statistics are usually based on: 
(a) Other statistics and surveys – polls 
of polls. An example is the Index of 
Economic Freedom (IEF) published by 
the Fraser Institute (Gwartney, Law-
son and Emerick 2003). 
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(b) Expert evaluations, e.g. Nations in 
Transit (hereafter NiT; Freedom 
House 2002 and 2003b). 
(c) A combination of (a) and (b), e.g. 
the Corruption Perception Index pub-
lished by Transparency International 
(hereafter TI; see website). 
Some statistics are more specific 
and the boundary does not have to be 
sharp. They deal with a single specific 
question or a bundle of them. Authors 
may or may not try to deduce global 
results, such as addressing whether ‘ad-
ministrative regulations in your country 
are 1 = burdensome, 7 = not burden-
some’, as does the GCR. These surveys 
may even try to deal with quantifiable 
questions, such how many days are 
needed to start a new business, which is 
estimated in the Doing Business survey 
published by the World Bank Group 
(hereafter DB; see website). 
The first type of survey, dependent 
on other polls, can be criticized for the 
weightings they give to particular sur-
veys, especially if there are connections 
between the sources and the final poll. 
The findings can similarly be question-
able. The second type is vulnerable for 
concentrating on specific questions put 
mainly to firms or law firms, so that it 
is questionable whether global findings 
about the environment can result. 
Other, general problems may arise 
with factors that impress experts or 
firms, such a general mood of optimism 
or pessimism. A good example is the 
state of the economy. All the problems 
that impact on firms will seem less pain-
ful in a period of growth than during a 
recession. There can be very similar ef-
fects on expert opinions, for example at 
time when everybody is writing about 
prevailing corruption in a country. Al-
though experts try to be as much objec-
tive as possible, they can hardly avoid 
being influenced by general opinion or 
the views of others. 
Additionally there can be general 
problems with the questions. The re-
sponse to the question ‘Administrative 
regulations in your country are 1 = 
burdensome, 7 = not burdensome’ de-
pends on the feelings of words and is 
highly subjective. An environment that 
Westerners would describe as burden-
some may be sensed differently in a 
transition country. That poses problems 
with the canvassed views of foreigners as 
opposed to domestic respondents, with 
both exhibiting imperfections. 
All the types of statistics mentioned 
have their drawbacks. It is tempting to 
concentrate on measurable questionnaires, 
but these are scarce and it is question-
able whether overall conclusions can be 
drawn from them. The paper therefore 
aims to provide as comprehensive a pic-
ture through all available statistics, in-
cluding some questions from the GCR, 
despite doubts about the overall strategy 
it employs. Both scores and placing of 
countries are given for all data sources, 
but with emphasis on the first. The 
analysis includes comparisons with other 
Central European countries – Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia – where helpful. 
The discussion of every topic begins with 
a description of the whole economic en-
vironment and then proceeds towards 
more specific questions, to yield as 
rounded a picture as possible. The inten-
tion is for the paper to arrive at the 
best combination of these approaches. 
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3) ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 
In analysing several characteristics of the 
overall environment, the paper dwells on 
the political, legal and overall economic 
environment, emphasizing some specific 
features. 
3.1. The political environment 
The influence of political freedoms on 
the economy is questionable.2 But it can 
be supposed that a stable political envi-
ronment devoid of misuse of political 
power lessen risks and costs for firms. 
Political freedom is also part of the 
complex of the rule of law. Generally 
speaking, greater political freedom in a 
country increases the probability of find-
ing a more accountable government and 
therefore less corruption, sounder eco-
nomic policies and less governmental 
malpractice. Put another way, want of 
political freedom decreases or rules out 
the possibility that economic freedoms 
are being observed.3  
This and the next two sections di-
vide into two sub-sections, on global, 
overall reports and on specific issues. 
                                                 
2 There are a few countries, such as China, 
where economic freedoms exist but political free-
doms are not respected. The evolution of both 
types in the long term is questionable. Many 
experts suppose a shift towards political freedom. 
For the disputes on the impact of democracy on 
economic development, see Todaro and Smith 
2003, for instance. 
3 This view is supported for example Freedom 
House 2003b, which finds a strong correlation 
between democratization and economic liberaliza-
tion in countries. 
Overall reports 
Freedom House, one of the most re-
spected organizations dealing with politi-
cal freedoms,4 publishes an annual sur-
vey entitled Freedom in the World, offer-
ing two indices that evaluate political 
freedoms around the world. One is tar-
geted at political rights – the ability of 
people to participate freely in the politi-
cal process: the right to vote and run 
for public office and elect representatives 
with a decisive vote on public policies. 
The other index measures the prevailing 
level of civil liberties, including the free-
dom to develop opinions, institutions, and 
personal autonomy without interference 
from the state. 
Both countries have scored similarly 
in both indices in the last decade and 
are deemed generally free; they have 
similar shortcomings in civil liberties (Ta-
ble 1). 
According to the survey, citizens of 
both countries generally enjoy all political 
rights. But there is criticism connected 
especially with discrimination against the 
Roma minority. There is in general no 
direct explanation of the scores. 
The other survey by Freedom House 
(2003b) concentrates on the countries of 
the Central and Eastern Europe and pro-
vides somewhat deeper information on: 
* The political process – national execu-
tive and legislative elections, develop-
ment of the multi-party system, and 
popular participation in the political 
process. Civil society – growth of non-
governmental organizations, organiza-
tional capacity and financial sustain-
ability of these, and the legal and po-
                                                 
4 A non-profit, non-partisan body collecting data 
on political freedoms since 1955. See website. 
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litical environment in which they func-
tion. 
* Media independence – the legal 
framework and present state of press 
freedom. 
* Governance and public administration 
– the authority of legislative bodies, 
decentralization of power, the respon-
sibilities, elections and running of lo-
cal-government bodies, and legislative 
and executive transparency. 
The scores for the two countries 
appear in Table 2. 
The tables show that political free-
doms are on similar levels in the two 
countries. Both show some decline in 
such freedoms at the end of 1990s, with 
the situation a little worse in the Czech 
Republic. The caveats were concentrated 
on the electoral process and development 
of civil society. However, governance re-
cently worsened in Hungary. This report 
again offers no direct explanations, 
apart from a comment: ‘The ratings and 
scores reflect the consensus of Freedom 
House, its academic advisors, and the 
author of this report.’ The reports are 
otherwise descriptive – analysing political 
developments and the political situation 
without justifying specific scores. The 
reservations mentioned are similar to 
ones found in main report of the or-
ganization (Freedom House 2003a). 
Specific reports 
There are all too few statistics of use 
for this paper, but some questions in the 
Global Competitiveness Report (hereafter 
GCR; Schwab, Porter and Sachs 2002) 
and WCY (IIMD 2001) seem interesting. 
According to the former, ‘The data used 
in the Report represents the best avail-
able estimates from various national au-
thorities, international agencies, and pri-
vate sources at the time the Report was 
prepared (July/August 2001).’ There are 
no indications as to how they arrive at 
specific data.5 (Table 3) 
The answers to the first two ques-
tions point to a stable political situation 
in both countries. The government gen-
erally keep the promises made by previ-
ous governments and political changes 
do not affect economic planning. But 
both countries display strong distrust to 
politicians, with a substantially worse 
situation in the Czech Republic. 
A similar source is the WCY.6 The 
surveys focus on the business impact, 
but some answers shed useful light on 
political development. (Table 4) 
This survey shows that political 
risks and adaptability were understood 
to be relatively high, again with signifi-
cantly better scores for Hungary. 
3.2. The legal environment 
Another section of the global economic 
environment is the legal system, which 
can obstruct economic development and 
operation of firms. Firms are directly 
influenced by many aspects of the law.7 
Among the most vital, perhaps, are en-
forcement of contracts and security of 
private property. Additions or amend-
ments to the legal system form a highly 
complicated long-term process. This was 
                                                 
5 These notes apply to all quotations from the 
report. 
6 The survey, sent to top and middle manage-
ment in 49 countries, was returned in 2001 by 
3678 respondents. Each responded about the 
country in which they work, so that the results 
reflect in-depth knowledge of each economy 
(IIMD 2001). 
7 The legal system has crucial importance for 
economic development (see North 1992). 
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true especially in the transformation pe-
riod, where the legal systems of transi-
tion countries had been deformed by the 
perceived needs of the communist party 
during the long period of totalitarian 
rule. Furthermore, all transition countries 
have had trouble law enforcement and 
the judiciary as well. Judges lacked basic 
knowledge of how a market economy 
functions and courts were unprepared 
for a surge of litigation.8 It is very hard 
to measure the state and/or development 
of the legal environment. Let us concen-
trate first on estimates evaluating the 
systems as a whole, before targeting 
particular statistics. The final sub-section 
considers corruption, one of the essential 
aspects of the legal environment. 
Overall reports 
One organization that has tried to grade 
the legal environment (in huge areas of 
the legal system) is the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD). This publishes annual Transition 
Reports (EBRD 2000, 2001, 2002 and 
2003). Up to 2002, two of the statistics 
included gave an overall picture of the 
legal environment in the transition 
economies, covering (i) commercial law – 
include pledge, bankruptcy and company 
law, and (ii) financial regulations – 
banking and capital-markets law.9 
According to the EBRD the meas-
ures were developed to ‘assess the extent 
to which key commercial and financial 
laws have reached internationally accept-
able standards (extensiveness) and the 
degree to which are these law imple-
                                                 
8 The overall support of judges for the new po-
litical and economic system is also questionable. 
9 The grading was derived from the views of 
local lawyers. The numbers seem to be the result 
of careful research (see Conditions, EBRD 2003). 
mented and enforce (effectiveness)’. De-
velopments of both are depicted in Ta-
bles 5, 6 and 7. 
The situation in commercial law has 
been substantially better in Hungary than 
in the Czech Republic since 1999 – after 
the grades of the latter worsened. Hun-
gary, on the other hand, had close to 
maximum scores from the beginning of 
publication of the annual report until a 
slight worsening after 1999. The situation 
of the Czech Republic improved to Hun-
garian levels in 2002. 
The second indicator gives a differ-
ent comparison. Financial regulations 
have been stable and of high quality in 
Hungary since 1998–2000. Then the 
situation seems to have worsened. On the 
other hand, the Czechs were lagging be-
hind and slightly improving during the 
period. The situation in both countries in 
2002 was comparable. 
Another institution grading the 
global legal system is Freedom House.10 
The Index of Constitutional, Legislative, 
and Judicial Framework highlights consti-
tutional reform, human-rights protection, 
criminal-code reform, the judiciary and 
judicial independence, and the status of 
ethnic minority rights. 
The same patterns appear in the 
EBRD ratings. The numbers are relatively 
low, so that the situation in both coun-
tries should be regarded as relatively 
good over the whole period. But the en-
vironment in the Czech Republic has 
been significantly worse than in Hungary 
since 1999, with a sharp worsening of 
                                                 
10 These grades are part of the NiT survey al-
ready quoted. It should be recalled that ‘the rat-
ings and scores reflect the consensus of Freedom 
House, its academic advisors, and the author of 
this report’. The report otherwise mentions only 
development and specific events in the year, so 
that the authors do not justify the individual 
grading. 
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the legal situation at that year. On the 
other hand, the ratings for Hungary 
were stable over the whole period. 
Specific reports 
Some organizations publish specific re-
ports on a particular question or prob-
lems (usually as part of a larger task). 
One of the most interesting is the World 
Bank database DB,11 several of whose 
findings are mentioned in the following 
pages. On the legal environment, an in-
teresting part of their data is concerned 
with contract enforcement. The section of 
the survey compares four sets of infor-
mation that can be extracted from the 
‘process of debt-recovery cases before 
local courts in the country’s most popu-
lous city’.12 The first of the indicators 
supplies the number of proceedings 
mandated by law or court regulation 
(demanding interaction between the par-
ties or between them and the judge or 
court officer). The second indicator de-
notes the number of days (from the 
moment the plaintiff sued in court until 
the moment of actual payment). The 
third indicator depicts the cost of the 
whole proceedings (including court costs 
and attorneys’ fees, as well as payments 
to other professionals such as account-
ants and bailiffs). Additionally, the study 
offers information about how complicated 
the whole proceedings are – the Proce-
dural Complexity Index.13 (Table 8) 
                                                 
11 According to the World Bank: ‘DB aims to 
provide a new set of objective, quantifiable 
measures of business regulations and their en-
forcement.’ See website. 
12 Data on contract enforcement are derived 
from responses to questionnaires by lawyers in 
private practice. 
13 The index is calculated from six sub-indexes. 
See World Bank website. 
This survey finds advantages and 
drawbacks in the systems for enforcing 
contracts in both countries. In the Czech 
Republic, the duration and number of 
the steps are lower, but the system is 
more complicated and more expensive to 
deal with. In Hungary, the system is less 
expensive and less complicated, but sub-
stantially longer. By comparison with the 
average for high-income OECD countries, 
cases take longer and dealing are more 
complicated in both countries. 
The same survey offers data about 
winding up a business that says a lot 
about the functioning of the legal system 
and ability of market actors to recover 
credit extended. The authors concentrate 
on four characteristics of the cases, 
which are carefully specified in detail 
(see World Bank group website): 
* The time needed to complete a proce-
dure, as estimated by insolvency law-
yers. 
* The actual costs associated with com-
pleting insolvency proceedings in 
court. 
* The Goals-of-Insolvency Index, which 
gives an overall view of the insolvency 
system (100 is the most efficient). 
* The Court-Powers Index, which meas-
ures the degree to which the court 
runs insolvency proceedings through 
an average of three indicators: 
whether the court appoints and re-
places the insolvency administrator 
without restrictions imposed by law, 
whether the reports of the administra-
tor are accessible only to the court, 
not to creditors, and whether the 
court decides on adoption of the re-
habilitation plan. The index is scaled 
from 0–100, with higher values indi-
cating greater court involvement. 
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The results are not encouraging for 
either country, but the Czech case is 
worse than the Hungarian. The duration 
of insolvency proceedings is remarkable 
and amounts to an inability to assert 
property rights in case of insolvency. 
Costs are the same in both countries and 
high by comparison with a high-income 
OECD country. It is similar with the rest 
of indicators, which are notably worse in 
the Czech Republic. (Table 9) 
The last Transition Report (EBRD, 
2003) published statistics on secured 
transactions, based on a 34-point ques-
tionnaire put to a sample of lawyers. 
The time required, the amount of se-
cured property and the simplicity of the 
process were evaluated. 
Hungary was classed in a group 
with Lithuania and Slovakia labelled ‘ad-
vanced reform countries’ and the Czech 
Republic in second group of ‘major re-
form countries’. It can be seen that 
Hungary has no trouble with the ‘proc-
ess’ part, and even in the ‘scope’ part, 
its results are much better than the 
Czech Republic’s. (Table 10) 
Another to some extent specific in-
dex is offered by other survey by the 
EBRD – the Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey (Fries, 
Lysenko and Polanec 2003).14 These sur-
veys involved on questioning 6153 firms 
in 26 countries of the region in 1999 
and 4041 firms in 25 countries in 1999. 
The authors took a similar approach to 
the researchers in the World Bank 
group. They too concentrated on the av-
erage amount of time needed to resolve 
                                                 
14 An initiative of the European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (EBRD) and the 
World Bank to investigate the extent to which 
government policies and practices facilitate or 
impede business activity and investment in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth 
of the Independent States. 
an overdue payment. In their case, the 
measure reflects the time spent pursuing 
a claim through the courts and through 
alternative collection procedures. The au-
thors asked respondents how long on 
average it took to collect overdue pay-
ments and how frequently firms paid 
bribes in their dealings with the courts. 
Several questions were aimed at gather-
ing information on confidence in the 
courts.  
These together created a Judiciary 
Index,15 in which the Czech Republic and 
Hungary achieved the scores in Table 11. 
The results seem to augment the previ-
ous survey. The situation in Hungary in 
both years was likewise significantly bet-
ter than in the Czech Republic, but the 
figures point to an improvement in both 
economies after 1999, with Hungary ap-
proaching the ideal. 
Use can also be made of the GCR 
(Schwab, Porter and Sachs 2002) to ad-
dress specific questions to do with the 
legal environment (Table 12). 
The first two questions seem to 
support the belief that neither country 
has an optimal judicial environment. But 
as in the previous surveys, the Czech 
Republic emerges as much worse. The 
responses to the second question seem to 
confirm the problems with property 
rights mentioned in connection with the 
World Bank group. The third question 
was already mentioned when describing 
the political environment. From point of 
view of costs, legal changes in recent 
years have not affected firms seriously in 
either country. 
Similar surveys appear in the WCY 
(Table 13). 
                                                 
15 No specific information on weightings is given 
in the survey report. 
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These answers all support the idea 
that the legal environment is better in 
Hungary than in the Czech Republic. The 
Hungarian situation is relatively good – 
all the fingers are higher than the me-
dian 5. On the other hand the Czech 
results are all below the mean and sub-
stantially worse than the Hungarian ones. 
3.3. Corruption 
Corruption is a characteristic of the legal 
environment. It is difficult to spot as it 
appears in many different forms. Cor-
ruption increases transaction costs and 
risks, and decreases the credibility of a 
country and the trust of market agents. 
So there is direct impact on the ability 
of firms to compete on international 
markets. Economists suspect a negative 
correlation between prevailing level of 
corruption and foreign direct investment. 
There are obvious problems with meas-
uring corruption and comparing it inter-
nationally. 
The leading supplier of international 
data on corruption nowadays is Trans-
parency International (TI),16 which pub-
lishes an annual survey: the TI Corrup-
tion Perception Index. This is highly 
popular with all parties concerned with 
corruption (pressures groups, govern-
ment or ordinary people) and is often 
quoted. The index is actually a poll of 
polls. Among the sources for 2003 are 
the GCR (some specific questions), the 
WCY, the World Business Environmental 
Survey, the Freedom House NiT report 
and several similar studies, including one 
                                                 
16 TI, according to its website, is ‘the only inter-
national non-governmental organization devoted 
to combating corruption, brings civil society, 
business, and governments together in a powerful 
global coalition’. See website. 
by Gallup International for the TI.17 The 
index is constructed as a simple average 
of standardized data from the surveys. 
In the opinion of the TI, it reflects ‘the 
perceptions of business people, academics 
and risk analysts, both resident and non-
resident’ (TI website). Perceptions are 
graded 0–10, with a higher number as 
less corruption and 10 as a corruption-
free environment (Table 14). 
The development seems to indicate 
clearly worsening corruption in the 
Czech Republic in the second half of the 
1990s, as opposed to a relatively stable 
situation in Hungary. The two countries 
were in similar positions in 1996, but 
the Czech Republic has become noticea-
bly the worse since then. Even Hungary 
did not achieve in 2003 half the point 
score of the best country. The high and 
low range in 2003 was 4–5.6 for Hun-
gary and 2.6–5.6 for the Czech Republic. 
Another source of information 
about corruption is NiT from Freedom 
House, mentioned earlier. The results 
appear in Table 15. The corruption in-
dex looks at ‘perceptions of corruption 
in the civil service, the business interest 
of top policy-makers, laws on financial 
disclosure and conflict of interest, and 
anti-corruption initiatives’. The report in-
cludes the comment that ‘the ratings and 
scores reflect the consensus of Freedom 
House, its academic advisors, and the 
author of this report.’ 
These results seem to support the 
view of TI. The corruption environment 
seems to be strong in both countries, 
but significantly worse in the Czech Re-
public. However, the findings should be 
interpreted with caution. According to 
short comments in the report, an impor-
                                                 
17 The number of surveys included varied signifi-
cantly over the period. See Table 14. 
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tant source of information was the TI 
Corruption Perception Index. On the 
other hand, Freedom House 2003b 
quotes the TI Corruption Perception In-
dex 2003 as a source. So there is some 
interconnection between the two, which 
may make the overall results misleading. 
Some additional responses on cor-
ruption appear in the WCY (Tables 16). 
This survey supplements the previous. 
The situation in the public sphere is not 
optimal in either country, but in the 
Czech Republic, it is substantially worse. 
As in the previous part, some of 
the GCR can be used to shed light on 
questions connected with corruption (Ta-
ble 17). 
The first four questions describe the 
environment through what managers 
think of the situation in their industries. 
The results are not encouraging, espe-
cially not for the Czech Republic, which 
is always below the mean and worse 
than Hungary. The Hungarian situation 
seems significantly better, with results 
usually above the mean and so in a bet-
ter international position as well. The last 
question, about costs of other firms mis-
behaving, may be surprising. While 
Hungary’s position is similar (or slightly 
better) than for the previous questions, 
that of the Czech Republic is significantly 
better. 
Another index of corruption is part 
of the EBRD Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey mentioned 
earlier (Fries, Lysenko and Polanec 
2003). The findings are based on ques-
tioning entrepreneurs. It is obvious that 
corruption is not only a problem for the 
business sector, but a survey focusing on 
firms should give another view of the 
problem. At the centre of the corruption 
part of the study is a so-called ‘bribe 
tax’, defined as ‘unofficial payments to 
public officials’. 
The results are again surprising in 
comparison with the prevailing feeling of 
previous reports. The trend in both 
countries should be substantially improv-
ing – fewer companies admit offering 
bribes. Another surprise may be the po-
sition of Czech firms compared with 
Hungarian – in 1999, fewer of them 
offered albeit larger bribes. The situation 
developed further up to 2002, with the 
proportion of firms offering bribes 
halved and the yield of the ‘tax’ also 
declining sharply. (Table 18) 
3.4. The economic environ-
ment 
The last part of the analysis concerns 
the economic environment as a whole, 
especially economic freedom. It is an-
other large and diverse field, covering 
government regulation, interference in 
prices, labour-market intervention, trade 
protectionism and similar activity. The 
impact on competitiveness is direct. If 
firms are less free, they have higher 
costs that make them less competitive. 
Some authors (e.g. Gwartney, Lawson 
and Emerick 2003) posit a strong corre-
lation between economic freedom and 
per-capita income, economic growth and 
life expectancy.18 
There are again different ways of 
approaching the subject. Some organiza-
tions publish reports of economic free-
doms that try to aggregate surveys into 
an index intended to describe the overall 
economic environment. These have some 
                                                 
18 On the impact of the regulations on the eco-
nomic environment, see Pejovic 1998. 
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value and are quoted in the first section. 
The second concentrates on specific 
characteristics connected with state regu-
lation, such as how long it takes to start 
a business or the time spent dealing with 
state officials.19 
Overall reports 
Two organizations issue reports of eco-
nomic freedom on a global level: the 
Heritage Foundation and the Fraser Insti-
tute. 
The former publishes an annual In-
dex of Economic Freedom, which its au-
thors define as measuring ‘the absence 
of government coercion or constraint on 
the production, distribution, or consump-
tion of good and services beyond the 
extent necessary for citizens to protect 
and maintain liberty itself.’ Ten catego-
ries (see below) are included and 
weighted equally.20 The findings for both 
countries appear in Chart 1. 
The two countries are in roughly 
similar positions, according to the index, 
with the Czech Republic seen as a little 
freer throughout the period. In addition 
to the overall score (and to give picture 
of how it was arrived at), the authors 
publish a summary briefly describing the 
countries’ background.21 These numbers 
are interesting enough to consider all the 
values for the last year, but it was de-
cided to concentrate on the field of gov-
ernment regulation in this paper. (Table 
19) 
                                                 
19 The author chose this field as one connected 
closely with the previous chapters of the paper. 
20 The scores in each category are based on 
other surveys. For a detailed description, see 
Heritage Foundation 2004. The data cover the 
second half of 2002 to the first half of 2003. 
21 There is a two-page description for each 
country and short notes on every field. 
The main category here is ‘regula-
tion’, which covers, for example: 
* Licensing requirements to operate a 
business. 
* Ease of obtaining a business licence. 
* Corruption within the bureaucracy. 
* Labour regulations. 
* Regulations that impose a burden on 
business. 
Both Central European countries 
score 3 in this field, which means ‘mod-
erate’ regulation and corresponds specifi-
cally to ‘complicated licensing proce-
dures; regulation imposes substantial 
burdens on business; and similar.’ So the 
regulation burden is relatively high in 
both countries. In Hungary, the authors 
write, the regime meets EU standards, 
but the regulations are not always 
transparent or evenly applied. In the 
Czech Republic, they mention bureau-
cratic corruption as big problem, quoting 
foreign analyses. There are detailed fig-
ures on this in the next sub-section. 
The second of the global indexes is 
published by the Fraser Institute 
(Gwartney, Lawson and Emerick 2003).22 
The latest report – Economic Freedom of 
the World 2003 Annual Report – con-
tains 38 variables and the findings of 18 
surveys. The report, according to its au-
thors, is based on variables obtained 
from survey data published in the Inter-
national Country Risk Guide and the 
GCR. 
We will proceed the similar way as 
in the previous case. We will show the 
overall picture that the Index offers and 
then we concentrate our interest on – 
about state regulations. (Table 20) 
                                                 
22 The Fraser Institute is an independent Cana-
dian economic and social research and educa-
tional organization. See website. 
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The overall pictures for both coun-
tries improved over time, so that their 
scores and placings increased and re-
mained roughly similar. The leader in the 
last report was Hong Kong with an 
overall score of 8.6. The average score 
in 2001 was 6.35. 
The situation was different in the 
area of special interest for this paper. 
Regulation of businesses increased in 
2001 and was worse in both countries 
than in 1995. Otherwise, the situation 
was better in Hungary than in the Czech 
Republic. The rating was especially weak 
in administrative obstacles for new busi-
ness, which were high in Hungary and 
even higher in the Czech Republic. In 
other respects, some of the data seem 
questionable, for example, the sharp 
worsening of the index for price controls 
in Hungary last year and the strange 
jumps in the same indicator for the 
Czech Republic in previous years. 
Specific reports 
Specific data on government regulation 
of the economic environment appears, 
for instance, in the World Bank group 
survey DB (World Bank group website). 
One set of data concentrates on opera-
tions to do with starting a new business 
(Table 21). 
The results for both countries were 
worse than the OECD average,. Hungary 
had a below-average number of proce-
dures, but called for more capital and 
twice as much time for starting a busi-
ness. Though start-up costs were mark-
edly lower in the Czech Republic than in 
Hungary, they were much higher than in 
the average OECD country, while the 
whole process was time-consuming and 
complicated. 
The second source is again the 
GCR (Schwab, Porter and Sachs 2002, 
Table 22). This needs careful interpreting 
due to cross-linking with other statistics.  
The survey gives different figures 
from the previous, but the outcome is 
similar – start-ups are harder in the 
Czech Republic and take significantly 
more time despite fewer processes. Both 
countries have relatively low red-tape 
indicators, and both countries do well 
(relative to other countries) in the overall 
perception of regulation (6.08), although 
the actual scores are low, which means 
firms feel the burden is intense.  
The last of the surveys to be noted 
is the WCY (IIMD 2001, Table 23). The 
results seem worse than the previous. 
The bureaucracy burden is high in both 
countries, but the Czech situation is sig-
nificantly worse. 
4) CONCLUSIONS 
It is time to aggregate the data, draw 
conclusions in each field, and seek ex-
planations. 
Political rights are generally ob-
served in the Czech Republic and in 
Hungary. The specific surveys support 
the impressions gained from the overall 
statistics. This conclusion is unsurprising 
insofar as democracy is a requirement 
for EU entry. The surveys notice few 
reservations that would not remain an 
obstacle to economic development even if 
they improved. The two countries are in 
very similar positions in relation to com-
parable (minor) criticisms. 
The two legal systems are more in-
teresting to compare. The situation is not 
ideal in either country, but substantially 
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worse in the Czech Republic. This con-
clusion is supported by both overall and 
specific reports. In the specific case of 
corruption, the overall statistic from TI 
and most of the specific surveys support 
the notion that corruption in both coun-
tries is high and the situation stagnant if 
not worsening. It is worse in the Czech 
Republic. But there are interesting excep-
tions. The EBRD report on the business 
environment gives opposite results. It 
would be surprising if corruption overall 
were worsening in both countries (TI) 
but firms were paying substantially fewer 
bribes. The explanation for the difference 
in the findings could lie in the phrasing 
of the question. In the EBRD survey, it 
was directed at specific behaviour by 
firms, not at overall feelings or opinions 
about other actors’ behaviour. At least in 
the Czech Republic, a self-critical attitude 
(especially towards corruption) is very 
popular, so that the general level may 
be exaggerated in the survey. This analy-
sis gains further support from another 
direct question – 7.06 in of the GCR – 
where the effect on firms of other firms’ 
misbehaviour is surprisingly low com-
pared with the allegedly predominant 
level of corruption in both countries. 
This again is a  specific answer to a 
direct question, about how a particular 
actor is affected, not a global, vague 
question about prevalent corruption. So 
it does seem that the difference is in the 
formulation – of asking about what ac-
tors do or do not do, rather than what 
they suppose. But there are too few spe-
cific surveys available to prove this hy-
pothesis. On the other hand, the situation 
in both countries is obviously imperfect 
and far from being corruption-free 
countries like New Zealand or Denmark. 
Governments need to try to improve the 
environment and prevent such misbehav-
iour. 
With economic freedom, the overall 
figures are slightly better for the Czech 
Republic, but in areas of specific interest 
for this paper, the situation in Hungary 
is generally better (even where the statis-
tics are less ambiguous, as with the legal 
environment). 
An additional attribute that emerges 
in several surveys (TI, Freedom House 
and EBRD), is that the Hungarian situa-
tion is usually stable, with relatively 
small shifts up or down over the whole 
period studied. In the Czech Republic, 
there seem to have been dramatic 
changes. It is hard to imagine that the 
effectiveness of the legal environment for 
business should suddenly have worsened 
in a single year (1999), as the EBRD 
Transition Report 2000 suggests. The 
same appears to have happened with the 
overall legal environment, according to 
the NiT report of Freedom House (1.5 to 
2.25) – again in 1999. And even corrup-
tion should dramatically worsen accord-
ing to TI (even if not in one year) from 
5.2 in 1997 to 4.2 in 2002. It seems 
that these indexes were affected by other 
factors. In my point of view the main 
cause is disillusionment with the state of 
the Czech Republic following the cur-
rency crisis (1997) and subsequent reces-
sion. Before 1997, the country was a 
favourite with domestic and foreign ex-
perts. Everything changed with the reces-
sion and situation began to be seen in 
gloomier colours. The question is whether 
the earlier figures were wrong and the 
present ones are correct, or vice versa. 
Unfortunately, the discrepancies cast 
doubt on the figures, in the author’s 
view. 
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Another problem that arose in the 
research was interconnection between the 
statistics. The TI Perception Index and 
the NiT survey, for instance, seem to be 
tightly bound up, which leaves overall 
results questionable. 
Regardless of these doubts, it seems 
at least that the legal system in Hungary 
is substantially better than in the Czech 
Republic. The Czechs should work on 
improving their legal environment, espe-
cially in protecting property rights. This 
is a crucial step towards improving the 
global abilities of entrepreneurs. There 
can be many different explanations for 
the difference, such as the weakness of 
all Czech governments since 1996, but 
the author finds the roots go deeper. 
Changing the legal environment is long-
term concern and initial conditions mat-
ter. In its legal system, Hungary was in 
a substantially better initial position than 
Czechoslovakia. Table 24 demonstrates 
the obvious differences among countries 
in legislative fields and the whole busi-
ness environment. 
Similar excuses can be hardly given 
in state regulation, which is relatively 
easy to change. It should not be diffi-
cult, for example, to decrease the time 
required to start a new business. The 
governments of both countries need to 
simplify bureaucracy, clarify claims and 
decrease the time needed to deal with 
state administrators. 
 
* * * * * 
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Table 1 
Status, political rights and civil liberties in Hungary and the Czech Republic, 1993–2003 
 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Hungary Free Free Free Free Free Free Free Free Free Free Free 
   Political rights 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
   Civil liberties 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Czech Republic - Free Free Free Free Free Free Free Free Free Free 
   Political rights - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
   Civil liberties - 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Source: Freedom House 2003a. 
Political rights – 1: close to ideal… 7: political rights absent; civil liberties – 1: close to ideal; 2: deficien-
cies in 3–4 aspects, but still relatively free… 7: virtually no freedom. 
 
 
Table 2 
Components and overall grading of democratization in the Czech Republic and Hungary, 
1997–2003 
 
Czech Republic 1997 1998 1999 2001* 2002 2003 
   Electoral process 1.25 1.25 1.75 1.75 2.00 2.00 
   Civil society 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.75 1.50 
   Independent media 1.25 1.25 1.75 2.00 2.50 2.25 
   Governance 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.25 2.25 
Democratization scores 1.50 1.50 1.75 1.81 2.13 2.00 
 
Hungary 1997 1998 1999 2001 2002 2003 
   Electoral process 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 
   Civil society 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 
   Independent media 1.50 1.50 2.00 2.25 2.25 2.25 
   Governance 1.75 1.75 2.50 3.00 3.00 2.50 
Democratization scores 1.50 1.50 1.75 1.94 1.94 1.81 
Source: Freedom House 2003b. 
* There are no data for 2000 in the source. 
Scores are on a scale of 1–7, with 1 as the highest and 7 as the lowest level. 
 
 
Table 3 
Statistics describing the political environment in 2001 – scores and placings 
 
 Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovenia Slovakia Leader Mean 
6.05 Government commitments – 
new governments honour con-
tractual commitments and obli-
gations of previous regimes: 1 
= not true, 7 = true. 
5.1 (31) 4.2 (48) 5.2 (27) 4 (55) 4.5 (45) 
Switzer-
land 
(6.7) 
4.8 
6.07 Cost of institutional change – 
legal or political changes over 
past five years have 1 = se-
verely undermined your firm’s 
planning capacity, 7 = had no 
effect. 
5.2 (18) 4.9 (28) 4.9 (29) 3.4 (63) 5.1 (25) Finland (6.6) 4.5 
7.07 Public trust of politicians – 
public trust in the honesty of 
politicians is 1 = very low, 7 = 
very high. 
1.9 (58) 2.6 (41) 2.4 (45) 2.8 (36) 3.0 (32) 
Singa-
pore 
(6.4) 
2.9 
Source: Schwab, Porter and Sachs, 2002. 
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Table 4 
Statistics describing the political situation, 2001 
 
 
Czech 
Republic Hungary Poland Slovenia Slovakia Leader 
2.3.12 Political system – 0 = not 
well adapted to today’s eco-
nomic challenges, 10 = well 
adapted. 
4.185 (29) 5.273 (16) 3.538 (36) 3.692 (35) 3.886 (33) Singapore (7.761) 
2.3.20 Risk of political instability – 
0 = very high, 10 = very 
low 
6.264 (31) 7.818 (22) 4.594 (41) 5.231 (37) 6.543 (27) 
Luxem-
bourg 
(9.895) 
Source: IIMD 2001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Indicator for commercial law in the transitional countries, 1997–2002 
 
2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997*  
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Czech Republic 4- 4- 4- 3 3 3 3+ 3 3+ 3 3+ 3- 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Hungary 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4- 4 4- 4- 4 4- 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Poland 3+ 3+ 4- 3+ 4- 3 4- 4- 4 3+ 4 3 4 4 4 4 4+ 4 
Slovakia 3+ 3 3+ 3+ 3+ 3+ 3 3 3 3 3+ 3 2 3 2 3 3 3 
Slovenia 3+ 3+ 4- 4- 4- 4 4- 4 4- 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 4 3 
Source: Transition report 2002, 2000 
* The indicator was first published for 1997. 
Extensiveness: 
3 New or amended legislation has recently been enacted in at least two of the three areas on which 
this paper focuses – pledge, bankruptcy and common law – but could benefit from further refine-
ment and clarification. Legal rules permit a non-possessory pledge over most types of movable assets. 
4 Comprehensive legislation exists in at least two of the three areas on which this paper focuses. 
4+ Comprehensive legislation exists in all three areas of commercial law on which this paper focuses. 
Legal rules closely approximate to those of developed countries. 
Effectiveness: 
3 Commercial law is reasonably clear; administration of justice is often inadequate or inconsistent, cre-
ating a degree of uncertainty. 
4 Commercial law is reasonably clear; administration of justice is reasonably adequate. 
4+ Commercial law is clear and readily ascertainable, and well supported administratively and judicially, 
particularly efficient functioning of the courts, liquidation proceedings, orderly and timely registration 
of shares, and orderly and timely registration of security interests. 
Overall score – average of the two indicators. 
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Table 6 
Legal transition indicator: financial regulation – banking and financial institutional law and 
regulation of capital markets 
 
2002 2001 2000 1999 1998  
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Czech Republic 3 3+ 3 3+ 3+ 3 3+ 4 3- 3 3+ 2+ 3 3+ 3- 
Hungary 3+ 3+ 4- 4- 4- 4- 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Poland 3+ 4- 3+ 3+ 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4- 4 3 
Slovakia 3- 3 2+ 3 3 3 3 3 3- 3+ 4 3+ 3- 3 2 
Slovenia 3 3+ 3 4- 4 4- 4 4 4 3+ 3+ 3+ 3 3+ 3- 
Source: EBRD: Transition report 2002 
Extensiveness: whether legal rules for banking and capital markets approach minimum international stan-
dards, such as the Core Principles of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision. Effectiveness of 
legal reform measures: the extent to which legal rules for commerce and finance are clear, ac-
cessible and adequately implemented, administratively and judicially. 
Extensiveness  
3 Legislation for financial markets is perceived as reasonably comprehensive but could benefit from 
refinement in some areas. Banking rules appear generally to conform to the Basle Committee’s Core 
Principles, although rules on bank insolvency and deposit protection may not have been adopted. 
4 Comprehensive financial-market legislation is perceived as conforming generally to minimum interna-
tional standards. However, refinement appears to be needed in at least one important area of either 
banking or securities regulation. 
4+ Banking and capital-market legislation and regulation are perceived as comprehensive and in con-
formity with minimum international standards. 
Effectiveness 
2 Legal rules are perceived as somewhat unclear and sometimes contradictory. Supervision of financial 
institutions appears to exist only on an ad hoc basis. 
3 Although legal rules on financial markets are perceived as reasonably clear, regulatory and supervi-
sory support may be inconsistent, creating a degree of uncertainty. 
4 Legal rules on financial markets are perceived as readily ascertainable. Banking and securities laws 
seem well-supported administratively and judicially, particularly regarding efficient enforcement meas-
ures against failing institutions and illegal market practices. 
4+ Regulators appear to possess comprehensive enforcement powers and exercise authority to take cor-
rective action on a regular basis. 
Overall score – average of the two indicators, rounded down. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 
The constitutional, legislative and judicial framework 
in the Czech Republic and Hungary, 1997–2003 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2001 2002 2003 
Czech Republic 1.50 1.50 2.25 2.50 2.50 2.50 
Hungary 1.75 1.75 1.75 2.00 2.00 1.75 
Source: Freedom House 2003. 
Ratings based on a scale of 1–7, with 1 the highest and 7 the lowest level. 
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Table 8 
Enforcing contracts in January 2003 
 
Region or Economy Number of proce-dures Duration (days) 
Cost (% GNI per 
capita) 
Procedural Com-
plexity Index* 
Czech Republic  16 270 18.5 65 
Hungary  17 365 5.4 57 
Poland  18 1000 11.2 65 
Slovak Republic  26 420 13.3 40 
Slovenia  22 1003 3.6 65 
Europe & Central Asia 25 344 27.9 56 
OECD high-income  17 233 7.1 49 
Source: The World Bank group website. 
* Ranging from 0–100, with higher values indicating greater procedural complexity in enforcing a con-
tract.  
 
Table 9 
Winding up a business in January 2003 
 
 Actual time (years) Actual cost    (% of assets) 
Goals-of-Insolvency 
Index Court-Powers Index
Czech Republic 9.2 38 22   0 
Hungary 2.0 38 38 33 
Poland 1.5 18 70 67 
Slovak Republic 4.8 18 71 67 
Slovenia 3.7 18 41 67 
Europe & Central Asia 3.2 15 51 57 
OECD high-income 1.8   7 77 36 
Source: World Bank group website. 
 
Table 10 
Qualifying factors in the enforcement process by the EBRD 
 
 Process Scope 
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Czech Republic 1 1 3 2 1 1 3 3 3 3 2 1 
Hungary 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 3 3 1 1 1 
Poland 3 2 3 2 1 3 1 1 1 1 2 1 
Slovak Republic 2 1 1 3 1 2 1 3 3 1 1 1 
Slovenia 3 3 1 2 1 3 3 2 3 2 3 2 
Source: The EBRD: Transition report 2003 
Scores: 1–3; 1 – no significant problems or limitations; 2 – relatively minor problems or limitations; 3 – 
major problems or limitations. 
* Although assessment was based on respondents’ replies, reference was also made to the EBRD–BEEPS 
and Transparency International Corruption Perception Index. 
Debtor obstruction: chances for a debtor to prevent, impede or otherwise obstruct enforcement. 
Preferential creditors: impact of other creditors’ claims on satisfaction of a secured creditor’s claim. 
Creditor control: ability of a creditor to control or influence the conduct of the enforcement process. 
Practical experience: general level of experience with the enforcement process in the country. 
Corruption: impact on the enforcement process of corruption within the judicial system.  
Institutions: reliability of the courts and other institutions necessary to the enforcement process. 
Scope of collateral: chance of enforcing replacement assets and subsequently acquired assets included in 
the general description of the collateral. 
Insolvency procedures: impact of the debtor’s insolvency on the enforcement process. 
Insolvency ranking: priority of a secured creditor’s claim upon an insolvent debtor. 
Inventory: assessment of the simplicity and certainty of the enforcement process for a charge on inven-
tory. 
Immovables: simplicity and certainty of the enforcement process for a charge on immovables. 
Receivables: simplicity and certainty of the enforcement process for a charge on receivables. 
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Table 11 
Average scores in the Judiciary Index in 1999 and 2002* 
 
 1999 2002 
Czech Republic 2.48 1.91 
Hungary 1.96 1.51 
Poland 2.35 2.47 
Slovakia 2.26 2.50 
Slovenia 2.29 2.02 
Source: Fries, S., T. Lysenko and S. Polanec (2003). 
* 1 – best case; 4 – worse case. 
 
 
Table 12 
Statistics describing the legal environment – scores and placings 
 
 Czech 
Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia Slovenia Leader Mean 
6.01 Judicial independence – judici-
ary independent and not subject 
to interference by government 
and/or parties to disputes (1 = 
not true, 7 = true). 
4.0 (44) 5.3 (24) 5.0 (32) 4.0 (45) 4.4 (38) Germany (6.7) 4.4 
6.02 Property rights – financial as-
sets and wealth are 1 = poorly 
delineated and protected by 
law, 7 = clearly delineated and 
protected. 
4.4 (50) 5.3 (32) 4.6 (47) 5.2 (34) 4.8 (43) Iceland (6.6) 5 
6.07 Cost of institutional change – 
legal or political changes over 
past five years have 1 = se-
verely undermined your firm’s 
planning capacity, 7 = had no 
effect 
5.2 (18) 4.9 (28) 4.9 (29) 3.4 (63) 5.1 (25) Finland (6.6) 4.5 
Source: Schwab, Porter and Sachs 2002. 
 
 
Table 13 
The legal environment 
 
 Czech 
Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia Slovenia Leader 
2.3.09 – Legislative activity of par-
liament (0 = does not meet, 10 
= meets competitive requirements 
of the economy). 
4.528 
(24) 5.879 (10) 4.159 (28) 4.769 (20) 4.000 (32) 
Singapore 
(8.060) 
2.3.18 Justice (0 = is not, 10 = is 
fairly administrative in society). 
3.66 (36) 5.58 (25) 2.84 43) 3.08 (42) 4.77 (31) Austria 
(9.04) 
2.3.19 Personal security and private 
property (0 = are not, 10=are 
adequately protected). 
4.87 (38) 6.00 (27) 2.75 (44) 4.92 (37) 5.66 (30) Austria (9.44) 
2.4.07 Legal framework (0 = is det-
rimental, 10 = is not detrimental 
to country’s competitiveness). 
4.906 
(37) 6.375 (22) 5.191 (33) 4.167 (41) 4.943 (36) 
Australia 
(8.429) 
2.4.14 Legal regulation of financial 
institutions (0 = is inadequate, 
10 = is adequate for financial 
stability). 
4.717 
(43) 6.438 (30) 5.172 (38) 5.692 (35) 4.667 (44) 
Finland 
(8.600) 
Source: IIMD 2001. 
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Table 14 
Perceptions of corruption, 1995–2003, scores and placings 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Czech Republic N/A. 5.37 (25) 5.20 (27) 4.8 (37) 4.6 (39) 4.2 (43) 
3.9 
(47) 3.7 (52)
3.9 
(54) 
Hungary 4.12 (28) 4.86 (31) 5.18 (28) 5 (33) 5.2 (31) 5.2 (32) 5.3 (31) 4.9 (33)
4.8 
(40) 
Best New Zea-
land (9.55) 
New Zea-
land (9.43)
Denmark 
(9.94) 
Denmark 
(10) 
Denmark 
(10) 
Finland 
(10) 
Finland 
(9.9) 
Finland 
(9.7) 
Finland 
(9.7) 
No. of coun-
tries 41 54 52 85 99 90 91 102 133 
No. of surveys* 7 10 7 12 17 16 14 15 17 
Sources: TI website.  
* The maximum of surveys used in a given year. The figures for Hungary and the Czech Republic were 
around two-thirds of these figures. 
 
 
 
 
Table 15 
Corruption index, 1999–2003 
  
 1999 2001 2002 2003 
Czech Republic 3.25 3.75 3.75 3.50 
Hungary 2.50 3.00 3.00 2.75 
Source: Freedom House 2003b. 
The ratings are based on a scale of 1–7, with 1 representing the 
lowest level of corruption. 
 
 
 
 
Table 16 
Corruption indicators, scores and placings 
 
 Czech    
Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia Slovenia Leader 
2.3.14 Public service 0 = is 
exposed to, 10 = is 
immune to political in-
terference. 
2.566 (35) 2.727 (32) 2.636 (33) 2.923 (30) 2.429 (38) Finland (6.050) 
2.3.16 Bribing and corrup-
tion 0 = exist, 10 = do 
not exist in the public 
sphere. 
2.340 (36) 2.485 (35) 1.363 (44) 1.846 (39) 2.771 (31) Finland (9.525) 
Source: IIMD 2001. 
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Table 17 
Statistics describing the corruption environment, scores and placings 
 
 Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia Slovenia Leader Mean 
6.04 Favouritism in decisions of gov-
ernment officials – when deciding 
policies and contracts, government 
officials 1 = usually favour well-
connected firms and individuals, 7 
= are neutral among firms and 
individuals. 
3 (48) 3.2 (43) 3.1 (44) 3.2 (42) 3.5 (32) Finland (5.7) 3.4 
7.02 Irregular payments in government 
procurement – how commonly do 
firms in your industry give irregu-
lar payments or bribes when get-
ting connected to public utilities? 1 
= common, 7 = never. 
4.5 (57) 5.8 (27) 4.7 (55) 5.0 (43) 5.3 (35) Iceland (6.9) 5.2 
7.03 Irregular payments in tax collec-
tion – how commonly do firms in 
your industry give irregular extra 
payments or bribes connected with 
annual tax payments 1=common, 
7=never 
4.3 (51) 5.7 (26) 4.7 (45) 5.0 (38) 5.2 (32) Iceland (7) 5.0 
7.04 Irregular payments in public con-
tracts – how commonly do firms 
in your industry give irregular ex-
tra payments or bribes connected 
with public contracts/investment 
projects? 1=common, 7=never 
3.1 (66) 4.8 (28) 3.6 (54) 4.0 (43) 4.1 (41) Iceland (7) 4.4 
7.06 Business costs of corruption – do 
unfair corrupt activities of other 
firms impose costs on your firm? 
1=impose large costs, 7=impose no 
costs 
5.1 (28) 5.3 (23) 4.9 (32) 5.0 (29) 4.8 (35) Iceland (6.9) 4.7 
Source: Schwab, Porter and Sachs 2002. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 18 
Frequency and extent of the ‘bribe tax’, % 
 
Proportion of firms making bribes 
frequently 
Average bribe tax as proportion of 
firm’s annual revenues 
 
1999 2002 1999 2002 
Czech Republic 26.0 13.3 1.7 0.9 
Hungary 32.3 22.6 0.9 1.0 
Poland 33.2 18.6 0.7 1.2 
Slovakia 33.6 36.0 1.3 1.4 
Slovenia* 7.7 7.1 1.4 0.8 
Average of countries sur-
veyed 
  1.9 1.6 
Source: Fries, Lysenko and Polanec 2003. 
* Slovenia was the clearest of the countries in the survey. 
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Chart 1 
Index of Economic Freedom, 1995–2004* 
2.38 2.33 2.29
2.43
2.14 2.2 2.1
2.29 2.35
2.39
2.93 2.98
3.05
2.94 2.89
2.43 2.38
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1.51 1.5 1.54
1.4
1.51 1.5
1.29
1.39 1.44 1.34
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Czech Republic Hungary Hong Kong
 
Source: Heritage Foundation (2004). 
1 – freest countries, 5 – economically most repressed countries. 
* Hong Kong was the leader throughout the period. 
 
 
 
 
Table 19 
Detailed scores in the IEF in 2003 
 
 Czech Republic Hungary Hong Kong 
Overall grading 2.39 2.6 1.51 
Rank 32 42 1 
Category: Mostly free Mostly free Free 
Trade policy 3 3 1 
Fiscal burden 3.9 3 1.9 
Government intervention 2.5 2 2 
Monetary policy 1 3 1 
Foreign investment 2 2 1 
Banking and finance 1 2 1 
Wages and prices 2 3 2 
Property rights  2 2 1 
Regulation 3 3 1 
Informal market* 3.5 3 1.5 
Source: Heritage Foundation 2004). 
 The scales run from 1–5. 1 – the economic environment or set of policies most conductive to economic 
freedom. 
* The source was the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (Heritage Foundation 
2004), which it was not convenient to include in the earlier part of the paper. 
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Table 20 
Economic freedom in the Czech Republic and Hungary in 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2001 
 
Czech Republic Hungary 
 
1995 2000 2001 1990* 1995 2000 2001 
Overall score (placing) 5.8 (68) 6.8 (43) 6.9 (39) 5.0 (74) 6.3 (46) 6.6 (52) 7.0 (35)
1. Size of gov’t 3.1 4.6 4.5 2.9 4.7 4.8 4.7 
2. Legal structure, security of property 
rights  
6.5 6.9 6.6 7.2 7.6 7.0 6.7 
3. Access to sound money  6.0 9.2 9.4 5.6 6.0 6.7 8.5 
4. Freedom to exchange with foreigners 7.8 7.8 8.1 4.8 7.0 7.4 8.5 
5. Regulation of credit, labour and 
business 
5.4 5.7 5.8 4.6 6.0 7.0 6.6 
C. Regulation of businesses 5.4 6.1 5.1  6.0 7.3 5.8 
(i) Price controls 6.0 4.0 7.0  8.0 8.0 5.0 
(ii) Admin. obstacles for new busi-
nesses 
 7.8 2.7   7.4 3.8 
(iii) Time spent with gov’t bureauc-
racy 
5.9 8.1 6.0  6.1 6.2 6.5 
(iv) Ease of starting a new business 6.0 5.5 4.5  6.4 7.4 6.8 
* There are no 1990 data for the Czech Republic. 
Scores on a 10-point scale with higher numbers meaning greater economic freedom. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 21 
Procedures for starting a business in January 2003 
 
 Number of procedures 
Duration 
(days) 
Cost 
(% of GNI p.c.) 
Minimum capital (% 
of GNI p.c.) 
Czech Republic  10  88  11.7  110.0  
Hungary  5  65  64.3  220.3  
Poland  12  31  20.3  21.4  
Slovak Republic  10  98  10.2  111.8  
Slovenia  10  61  15.5  89.1  
Europe & Central Asia 10  47  21.7  114.0  
OECD: High income  7  30  10.2  61.2  
Source: The World Bank group website. 
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Table 22 
Statistics describing state regulations – scores and placings 
 
 Czech 
Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia Slovenia Leader Mean
6.08 Regulation – administrative 
regulations in country are 1 = 
burdensome, 7 = not burden-
some. 
3.4 (24) 3.7 20) 3.3 (30) 3.0 (45) 3.2 (36) Hong Kong (5.9) 3.3 
6.10 Red tape – how much time 
firm’s senior management 
spends working with gov’t 
agencies or regulations. 1 = < 
10% of time 2 = 10–20%, 8 = 
71–80%. 
1.8 (13) 2.5 (50) 2.1 (39) 3.2 (71) 1.9 (20) Japan (1.4) 2.3 
8.04 Administrative burden for 
start-ups – starting a new 
business in country is generally 
1 = extremely difficult and time 
consuming, 7 = easy. 
4.3 (44) 5.4 (16) 5.2 (18) 2.8 (72) 4.4 (35) Hong Kong (6.4) 4.5 
8.05 Permits to start a firm – how 
many permits needed (median 
response) 
4 (24) 5 (35) 3 (5) 5 (35) 5 (35) Hong Kong (2) 4.8 
8.06 Days to start a firm – consid-
ering licence and permit re-
quirements, typical number of 
days required to start a new 
firm in country? (median re-
sponse) 
60 (54) 45 (46) 30 (19) 60 (54) 30 (19) Iceland (5) 40.2 
Source: Schwab, Porter, Sachs, 2002. 
 
 
 
Table 23 
The burden of bureaucracy 
 
 Czech  
Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia Slovenia Leader 
2.3.15 Bureaucracy: 0 = hinders 10= 
does not hinder business devel-
opment. 
2.566(30) 3.212 (23) 1.714 45) 1.538 (48) 1.629 (47) Singapore (6.687) 
Source: IIMD 2001. 
 
 
 
Table 24 
Chronology of selected reform measures in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia 
 
Reform measures Hungary Poland Czechoslovakia 
Bankruptcy legislation 1986 1983 1991, 1992 
Legislation on incorporated firms 1989 1990 1991 
Abolition of mandatory plans 1968 1982 1990 
First steps in price liberalization 1968 1957, 1975 1991 
Entry into IMF and World Bank 1982 1986 1990 
Considerable freedom to start a 
firm 1982 Unrestricted 1991 
Source: Kornai, 1996 
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